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Abstract
We derive a rational model of separable consumer choice which can also serve as a
behavioral model. The central construct is λ, the marginal utility of money, derived
from the consumer’s rest-of-life problem. We present a robust approximation of λ,
and show how to incorporate liquidity constraints, indivisibilities and adaptation to
a changing environment. We find connections with numerous historical and recent
constructs, both behavioral and neoclassical, and draw contrasts with standard partial
equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive
description of consumer choice.
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1 Introduction
John has just realized that it is his wedding anniversary. He enters the only liquor store in
town and looks for champagne. There is only one bottle, which costs $100. How does he
decide whether to buy it?
In this paper we argue that a consumer like John should recall his utility value for money,
call it λ, and use it to estimate the opportunity cost of spending $100. He should purchase
the champagne if and only if the utility it brings covers that opportunity cost.
Our recommendation might sound like common sense, but it differs sharply from what
economics textbooks propose. On the one hand, general equilibrium theory would require
John to consider the impact on all possible future consumption plans. As is widely rec-
ognized, for actual people, or even Homo Economicus facing moderate computation costs
or other frictions, this is too complex a problem to solve. Hence the alternative solution
proposed by micro textbooks (and by recent behavioral models of mental accounting): John
should have a preset budget to spend on items including last minute anniversary presents,
and should purchase the champagne if and only if that budget exceeds $100 and on the
margin the other claims on the budget are less pressing.
We shall argue that this second approach, although far more tractable, is twice crippled.
First, it is silent on how to specify the budget set. When and how should John come up
with the amount to spend and the range of goods considered? Second, the budget constraint
rules out substitution of purchasing power between present and future, thus preventing the
consumer from properly responding to present prices that turn out to be higher or lower
than expected.
We propose to use λ, the marginal utility of money, rather than a budget constraint, to
link the present problem to the rest-of-life problem. The numerical value of λ captures the
trade-off between current and rest-of-life expenditure, and thus allows the consumer to make
optimal saving/borrowing decisions. This approach resonates with the findings of consumer
research, and λ itself is a meaningful concept that can be approximated, learned and adjusted
in intuitive ways.
Our approach relates to several strands of consumer choice theory, some historical and
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some more recent. These include inter alia Marshall’s theory of demand; partial equilibrium
analysis; the use of cardinal and quasi-linear utility functions; and Frisch demand func-
tions and recursive life-cycle models. A distinctive aspect of our approach is how it connects
present and future choices. Our consumer occasionally adjusts her estimated marginal utility
of money looking forward, but when faced with a specific consumption choice she just uses
the current value of λ. Existing approaches either ignore the future entirely (partial equilib-
rium) or else refuse to consider the future as qualitatively distinct from the present (general
equilibrium). The simple connection we impose naturally leads to a better understanding of
where λ comes from and what makes it useful.
Our free standing theory of consumer choice includes the following innovations:
• Neo-classical foundations for (cardinal) quasi-linear utility and for the use of λ as a
rule of thumb.
• Proof of near-optimality of a λ-based response to price surprises.
• Extensions to choice among baskets of indivisible goods, and choice given liquidity
constraints.
• An adaptive learning model for λ, complementing the forward looking analysis, and
examples showing how λ can embody behavioral biases.
Section 2 begins the exposition with a review of the lifetime consumption problem and
its textbook solution. We then define separable subproblems, and use the indirect utility
function to obtain a quasi-recursive solution to the subproblem and its continuation problem.
The first order condition defines λ as the opportunity cost of subproblem expenditure.
Section 3 analyzes the subproblem solution given an exogenous value of λ. It shows
that the consumer moves out along the subproblem’s Income Expansion Path – the locus
of points where the ratio of marginal utility to price is the same for each good – until that
ratio equals λ. The solution yields the “moneysworth” demand function, whose price effects
and λ effects are shown to be quite natural. In particular, demand is always decreasing in
own price (hence there are no Giffen goods), while the cross price effects straightforwardly
reflect the goods’ substitutability or complementarity.
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Section 4 discusses how the consumer can calibrate λ. A Taylor expansion of indirect
continuation utility reveals that λ is approximately constant when subproblem expenditures
are small relative to lifetime income. An implication is that λ is reusable: consumers typically
need not adjust it between consecutive small purchases. Eventually, however, she does need
to update. We posit two complementary methods: one is forward looking and uses relevant
news in a life-cycle setting, while the other is experiential and uses previously observed prices
to update λ.
Section 5 recalls the textbook partial equilibrium approach, which holds the subproblem
budget constant, and yields the (oddly named) Marshallian demand function. Proposition
3 shows that the “true” lifetime optimal demand elasticities are typically well approximated
by those of the moneysworth demand function, but only under quite special conditions are
they close to the Marshallian elasticities.
Section 6 extends the model to include liquidity constraints, which are shown to corre-
spond to the situation where λ is a step function of available liquidity. Marshallian demand
reappears as an extreme case, where λ = 0 below the budget and λ = ∞ over the budget.
We also show that consumers can handle indivisibilities by comparing λ to an appropriately
defined quality-price ratio.
Section 7 reiterates that, compared to textbook approaches, the λ (or moneysworth)
approach offers (a) more robust prescriptions for how consumers should react to surprises,
(b) a better way to connect partial equilibrium to general equilibrium analysis, and also
(c) more plausible descriptions of actual human behavior. That section also notes fruitful
avenues for future research.
Appendix A concisely reviews connections to numerous relevant strands of existing lit-
erature.1 It begins with remarks on the historical development of demand theory. It then
connects to literature on ordinal vs. cardinal preferences and on quasi-linear utility. Finally,
it notes important connections to macroeconomics, and numerous ties to microeconomics
and behavioral economics. Appendix B collects mathematical details.
1The current draft puts this material in an appendix because of its length and heterogeneity, which
could easily sidetrack our line of argument. We are open to editorial suggestions on which parts might be
incorporated into the main text.
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2 Preliminaries
A consumer’s lifetime consumption plan X = {(x1, ..., xN) : xi ≥ 0} specifies the quantities
of all goods and services consumed at present and at all future dates in all contingencies.
The dimension N of the problem is astronomically large, given even moderate numbers of
goods, dates and contingencies at each date.2 We assume that the consumer has cardinal
preferences over consumption, represented by the utility function U˜ : <N+ → <, which also
accounts for time preferences and random termination. She takes the (expected) price vector
P = (p1, ..., pN) as given. Initially, we assume that the normalized lifetime purchasing power
L > 0 is freely transferable across purchases.3
Absent other constraints, the consumer’s problem can be written just as in the textbook,
max
X≥0
U˜(X) s.t. P ·X =
N∑
i=1
pixi ≤ L. (1)
The Lagrangian is
max
(X,µ)≥0
[
U˜(X) + µ(L−P ·X)
]
. (2)
Writing U˜i for the i
th partial derivative (or marginal utility), we have the first-order conditions
U˜i(X
∗) = µpi, i = 1, ..., N
L = P ·X∗. (3)
We have nothing novel to say about multiple, corner or non-differentiable solutions, so to
streamline the exposition we henceforth assume that (3) has a unique smooth solution
X∗(P, L) that solves the original problem (1). Sufficient conditions (e.g., U˜ is smooth,
monotone, Inada and concave) are well known (e.g., Bewley, 2007).
Our main concern is a situation where the consumer is not solving her full lifetime
problem, just a small part of it. A consumer subproblem is to choose an n-subvector of the
lifetime consumption plan X, where 1 ≤ n << N. By suitably reindexing, we can write
X = (x, χ), where x = (x1, ..., xn) is the subvector and χ = (xn+1, xn+2, ..., xN) is the rest of
life (or continuation) plan. The price subvector of P for the subproblem is p = (p1, ..., pn).
2Indeed, N could even be infinite and not affect our analysis.
3Prices that apply to future goods are discounted appropriately. For simplicity, we treat L as a constant,
but later note how it can be endogenized.
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The idea is to gain tractability by reducing the dimensionality from N ≈ 10100 in a realistic
lifetime problem to something small, perhaps n = 2 or 3.
That reduction is possible if the subproblem is separable, that is, if there are subutility
functions u : <n+ → < and U : <N−n+ → < such that for every consumption plan X = (x, χ)
we can, with negligible error, write
U˜(X) = u(x) + U(χ). (4)
A sufficient condition for separability is that the cross second partial derivative U˜ij(X) is
zero everywhere for all i = 1, ..., n and j = n + 1, ..., N . For example, even in the same
shopping episode the consumer can choose wine and cheese in one subproblem, and choose
cereals and milk in a second. Separability seems quite plausible for both subproblems.
Given P, the consumer’s lifetime indirect utility function is
V˜ (L) = max
X∈<N+
U˜(X) s.t. P ·X ≤ L. (5)
By construction, V˜ (.) is homogeneous degree zero in (L, P ) and increasing in L. Given strong
classic assumptions of the sort mentioned earlier, we can also assume that it is smooth and
concave, i.e., V˜ ′(.) > 0 and V˜ ′′(.) ≤ 0 in the relevant range (c.f. Varian, 1992, pp.102ff.).
Let V (.) be the indirect utility function for the continuation plan, obtained by imposing
the additional restriction x = 0 in equation (5). Then (4) gives us a helpful expression for
indirect utility:
V˜ (L) = max
x∈<n+
[u(x) + V (L− p · x)] , (6)
The equation says that if the subproblem is separable, then the only effect that the choice
of x has on rest-of-life utility is pecuniary – the subproblem expenditure p · x = ∑ni=1 pixi
reduces the consumer’s rest-of-life purchasing power.4
4In the special case that the same separable subproblem recurs every period, (6) closely resembles the
Bellman equation familiar to macroeconomists (where time discounting is built into V (.)). Note however,
that in general, V˜ differs from V not only in the value of the state variable (remaining wealth) but also in
the set of (dated) goods available to purchase.
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3 Moneysworth demand
The first-order conditions for (6), which characterize the principal subvector x∗ of the solution
X∗ to the lifetime problem, yield ui(x∗) = piV ′(L−p·x∗), i = 1, ..., n,. Reformatting slightly
yields
ui(x
∗) = λpi, i = 1, ..., n
λ = V ′(L− p · x∗), (7)
where λ = V ′(L − p · x∗) is the consumer’s marginal utility of money. We see that λ is a
sufficient statistic for the continuation problem, and tells us how much utility the consumer
could gain elsewhere if she cut back subproblem expenditure by a dollar. Otherwise put,
λ is the opportunity cost of subproblem expenditure, or the “shadow utility” of purchasing
power, or the “conversion rate” between utility and money.
The first line in (7) also has a nice interpretation. It says that the marginal utility vector
(or gradient) ∇u is proportional to the price vector p. Varying the conversion rate λ sweeps
out the locus of points satisfying the proportionality condition, a smooth one-dimensional
curve often called the Income Expansion Path. The IEP emanates from the origin (where
the marginal utilities are maximal) and extends into the interior of the subproblem con-
sumption set <n+. The marginal utility of each good decreases smoothly (and each by the
same percentage) as we move out along the IEP defined by the price vector p. To find
the demand vector satisfying both lines of (7) we simply move out along the IEP until the
common proportionality factor falls to the specified value λ.5 At that point, (7) holds and
the marginal utility of expenditure in the subproblem matches the marginal utility of money
λ specified for the rest-of-life.
Compared to equation (3), we see that (7) offers two simplifications: it reduces the
apparent dimensionality from N + 1 to n+ 1, and it replaces the budget equation in L by a
statement of how λ, the marginal utility of money, is determined.
5Of course, expenditure L−p ·x available for the continuation problem falls as we move out along the IEP
so, by concavity, V ′ increases. Thus a more complete informal description is that the falling proportionality
factor meets the rising V ′ at a unique point x∗ on the IEP; more formally, under present assumptions,
the intermediate value theorem and implicit function theorem guarantee a unique smooth interior solution
described by (7).
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The complexity of the original problem has not yet disappeared, however; it has just
been concentrated into the endogenous dependence of λ = V ′ on subproblem expenditure
y = p · x. Nonetheless, we will see that this dependence is often negligible, or at least easily
tractable.
3.1 Constant λ
We begin by analyzing demand when λ can be regarded as exogenous. In particular, suppose
that the curvature of the indirect utility function is negligible over a range of subproblem
expenditure y = p · x ∈ [0, y¯]. Here the marginal utility of money is essentially constant at
λ̂ = V ′(L), so V is given by its first order Taylor expansion
V (L− y) = V (L)− yλ̂. (8)
The consumer choice problem now becomes quite simple. Substituting (8) into the life-
time optimization problem (6) with y = p · x and dropping the irrelevant constant term
V (L) yields the unconstrained optimization problem
max
x≥0
[
u(x)− λ̂p · x
]
. (9)
Streamline notation by dropping the decoration on the now-exogenous parameter λ̂ and take
the first-order conditions for (9) to get
ui(x
λ) = λpi, i = 1, ..., n. (10)
We will refer to xλ(p) = (xλ1(p), ..., x
λ
n(p)), the solution of (10), as the moneysworth demand
function.6
3.2 Income and price effects
What are the comparative statics of xλ? A change in subproblem relative prices will shift
the IEP, causing both own-price and cross price effects. On the other hand, a move along
6For given constant λ, the Frisch demand function is formally equivalent to xλ, notwithstanding important
differences in interpretation; see Section A.3.
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the original IEP will arise from a change in the subproblem price level, a change in lifetime
income L, or anything else that changes λ. In this subsection we analyze both sorts of
comparative statics.
Shifts in the IEP are naturally described by second derivatives of the utility function.
Let H = ((uij)) denote the n×n Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives of subproblem
utility u(x), and let Hij denote the (n− 1)× (n− 1) submatrix with ith row and jth column
deleted. Vertical bars, e.g., |H|, denote the determinant.
Proposition 1. Given a separable subproblem of dimension n ≥ 2 with price vector p̂ ∈ <n++
and constant λ > 0, let xλ(·) >> 0, be the moneysworth demand function that uniquely solves
equation (10). Then its price sensitivities are
∂xλj
∂pi
(p̂) =
(−1)i+jλ |Hij|
|H| , for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}. (11)
A proof appears in Appendix B (as part of the proof of Proposition 3); for related results
see also Biswas (1977) and Browning et al. (1985). Note that for the special case of a single
good in the subproblem (n = 1) we have
∂xλ
∂p
(p̂) =
λ
u′(xλ)
. (12)
Properties of moneysworth demand can be gleaned from the formula (11). The i, j
symmetry of the formula (and of the matrix H) imply that the price-i sensitivity of good j is
the same as the price-j sensitivity of good i. Since H is negative definite, the determinants
|Hii| and |H| have opposite signs, so the formula tells us that ∂x
λ
i
∂pi
< 0, i.e., the own price
effect is always negative. Moneysworth demand therefore rules out Giffen goods.7
The cross-price effect is transparent when there are only two goods in the subproblem,
since in that case the formula collapses to
∂xλ1
∂p2
=
∂xλ2
∂p1
= −λu21
u11u22−u12u21 . The denominator is
positive by concavity, and so the cross price effect simply is a (sign-reversing) rescaling of
the cross partial derivative of u at the consumption point. If the goods are substitutes then
7This is intuitive, as a constant λ means that there are no income effects. As an empirical matter, it is
not clear that Giffen goods exist at all (c.f. Dwyer and Lindsay, 1984, and Nachbar, 1998), with the possible
exception of extreme poverty (c.f. Jensen and Miller, 2008) when indeed we would not expect consumers to
take the future into account and to exhaust whatever purchasing power they have.
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u21 < 0 and demand for a good will increase when the other good’s price rises, but if they
are complements then u21 > 0 and the same price rise will decrease demand. Thus, relative
price effects for moneysworth demand arise naturally from the second partial derivatives of
u, and are easy to interpret and explain.
The other sort of comparative statics, for shifts in λ, is also intuitive but, since less
familiar, will take some sorting out. First, note that cardinality in the sense of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern allows us to rescale the original utility function U˜ = u+U via an increasing
linear transformation, e.g. W˜ = a + bU˜ , where b > 0. Checking the definitions, one sees
immediately that rescaling has no effect on separability, while the indirect utility function and
hence the marginal utility of money scale by factor b. If we use utility function W˜ = w+W
in equation (10) instead of U˜ = u+U , then the factor b appears on both sides, and cancels.
Thus, as should be the case, moneysworth demand is invariant to linear rescaling of utility,
while the numerical value of λ scales in proportion b.
What about a change in the price level? A proportional shift in all prices from P to
cP (and wages, hence also L to cL), with c > 0, will shift λ inverse proportionately, to
λ/c. This can be seen from the general result that derivatives of homogeneous degree k
functions are homogeneous degree k−1, or verified directly: λnew = limch→0 V (cL−ch)−V (cL)ch =
c−1 limh→0
V (L−h)−V (L)
h
= c−1λ. The middle equality follows from the degree zero homogene-
ity of V . The intuition is simple: money is worth less at a higher price level.
The next section opens by examining the impact on λ of a real shift in lifetime income
L or subproblem expenditure y when indirect utility V is strictly concave. For the moment,
we note that in the constant-λ case we are considering here, moneysworth demand has no
income effects in the textbook sense, since subproblem expenditure is endogenous.
To summarize, a ceteris paribus shift in λ can arise from a shift in real lifetime income
after subproblem expenditure, or from a change in cardinal preferences, but not from merely
rescaling utility nor rescaling (L, P ). The impact of a ceteris paribus shift can be expressed
in terms of Hj(p), the Hessian matrix with its jth column replaced by the price vector p.
Differentiating (10) and applying Cramer’s Rule we have immediately that
Proposition 2. The sensitivity of moneysworth demand to the marginal utility of money is
∂xλj
∂λ
=
∣∣Hj(p)∣∣
|H| , for j = 1, ..., n. (13)
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Biswas (1977) includes the equivalent expression dx/dλ = H−1 · p. In the one-good case
(13) simplifies to ∂x
λ
∂λ
= p
u′′(xλ) < 0, capturing the intuitive notion that demand falls when the
(shadow) value of money increases. In the two-good case (13) simplifies to
∂xλj
∂λ
=
pjuii−piuji
|H| =
ujuii−uiuji
λ|H| . Thus an increase in the marginal utility of money can be decomposed into two
effects. The first one
ujuii
λ|H| is always negative, since (as noted above) the denominator is
positive and the numerator factor uii is negative by concavity. The second term −uiujiλ|H| is
positive if (and only if) the goods are substitutes, and it can outweigh the first term. In this
last case, the IEP bends backward and a higher λ will lead to a higher consumption of good
j.
4 Calibrating λ
Moneysworth demand is relevant when the consumer can both (a) treat λ = V ′(L− y) as a
constant independent of subproblem expenditure y = p · x, and (b) obtain a good estimate
of that value of λ. Let us deal with each condition in turn.
Constancy is guaranteed when rest-of-life utility is a constant returns to scale CES func-
tion, U˜(X) = [
∑N
i=1 aix
r
i ]
1/r for 0 6= r < 1, where ai > 0. In that case, λ is essentially a price
index for rest of life consumption and is independent of L and y; see e.g., Varian (1992, p.
112). The same is true, of course, for Cobb-Douglas utility, which is the r = 0 member of
the CES family.
More generally, indirect utility is concave, and we need to quantify the rate at which
marginal utility declines. The exact Taylor expansion yields
V ′(L− y) = V ′(L)− yV ′′(L− αy), for some α ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
Thus the endogenous marginal utility of money is seen to consist of its zero-expenditure
value λ̂ = V ′(L) – a constant exogenous to the subproblem – corrected by a term that is
proportional to the unnormalized curvature V ′′ = β ≤ 0 of the indirect utility function, so
the decline in λ is approximately linear in subproblem expenditure y = p · x.8
How good is that linear approximation? The long-time consensus from work on risk
aversion (reinforced by recent contributions such as Rabin, 2000) is that the concavity of the
8Only approximately linear because β is a second derivative evaluated at a point that can depend on y.
10
indirect utility function should be diminishing: we would expect that the marginal utility for
money diminishes more between a wealth of $100,000 and $200,000 than between $1,100,000
and $1,200,000. For us, then, the worst plausible case is that β is constant. In that case, the
exact Taylor expansion V ′(L) = V ′(0) + Lβ implies β = V
′(L)−V ′(0)
L
. Hence the error term
in (14) is proportional to y
L
, the size of the expenditure today relative to lifetime income.
Even in this worst plausible case, then, the constant λ approximation is good for small
subproblems.
A numerical example may help crystalize ideas. Let V (L) = c lnL as in Bernoulli’s classic
example, let lifetime income be L = $1 million (e.g., 50k/yr increasing over 20 years at the
discount rate), and let subproblem expenditure be y = $100 as for John’s champagne. Pick
the convenient utility scaling c = 106 so that John’s zero-expenditure marginal utility of
money is λ̂ = V ′(106) = c10−6 = 1. Equation (14) tells us that John’s marginal utility of
money if he spends the $100 is V ′(106 − 100) = λ̂ − 100β = 1 + z, where the correction
z > 0 is between −100β̂ = 102c[106]−2 = 102+6−12 = 1.00000 × 10−4 (where α = 0), and
−100β|α=1 = 102c[106 − 100]−2 < 1.00021 × 10−4. Notice that John’s λ is hardly affected
by a purchase in this range – it rises by about one-hundredth of 1% – and that this tiny
correction z is well approximated using β̂ = V ′′(L).
A general result follows easily from the last Proposition:
Corollary 1. The sensitivity of moneysworth demand to lifetime income is given by
dxλj
dL
= −β̂
∣∣Hj(p)∣∣
|H| , j = 1, ..., n, (15)
where β̂ = V ′′(L) ≤ 0.
Proof. Differentiate (14) and evaluate at y = 0 to obtain dλ
dL
= β̂. The chain rule tells
us that
dxλj
dL
=
∂xλj
∂λ
· dλ
dL
, so (15) follows from Proposition 2. QED.
Given that λ̂ is a good approximation, the remaining question is, how easy it is to
estimate. The definition of indirect utility is not encouraging, since it refers to the entire
lifetime maximization problem. But we only need to estimate the slope of that function, and
just for the continuation problem. Of course, at first blush the continuation problem seems
almost as complex as the entire problem, but there is a qualitative sense in which it simplifies
greatly when we split off the present subproblem. The present is always idiosyncratic, if
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only because we have observed prices to go on. The future is more nebulous, with enormous
amounts of uncertainty, and consumers may prefer to think of prices for broad categories
rather than for individual items of future consumption. In other words, while the present
subproblem needs to be modeled in fine detail, we can afford to treat the continuation
in a more abstract way when estimating λ.9 We do not propose a specific model for the
continuation, but note that a reasonable forward-looking estimate may be obtained using
the stationarity assumptions and aggregation routinely imposed in life-cycle models discussed
in Section A.3 below, or using a rule of thumb in the spirit of Love (2013).
It bears emphasizing that, once the consumer has a good estimate of her λ, she can
reuse it many times. Unlike a budget constraint, λ changes only slightly from one small
subproblem to the next, and doesn’t require frequent recalculation. However, eventually λ
will require updating, especially as the consumer learns more about herself and her possibly
changing circumstances. Some changes in the consumer’s view of the future, such as new
pension plan, can be dealt with using the Corollary above or minor extensions. Alternatively,
an adjustment of the parameters of the forward-looking life-cycle model is called for. Other
changes, for example encountering a new product for the first time, concern the current
subproblem, but have ramifications for the future – and therefore λ. The consumer should
be able to adapt λ as she observes prices over numerous subproblems.
We therefore propose a two step process for updating λ in light of accumulated experience.
The first step is to translate a price observation into news about the value of λ, and the second
is to determine the magnitude of the update.
Translation is straightforward for indivisible goods. As explained in Section 6.2 below,
the quality-price ratio u(b
k)
p·bk represents a new observation of λ. For divisible goods, that
procedure would never get a new observation, since x is chosen to satisfy u1(x)
p1
= λ. Instead,
the consumer evaluates the marginal quality-price ratio at the quantity xold chosen “last
time.” That is, the new observation of λ is u1(x
old)
pnew1
.
The second step weights each new observation according to its share in overall consump-
tion, as in simple price indices.10 Periodically – say, monthly – the consumer collects the
9The logic is reminiscent of quasi-hyperbolic discounting: there is a big difference between today and
tomorrow, but tomorrow and the day after look similar from the vantage point of today.
10Here we assume, for simplicity, that the consumer does not try to extrapolate from individual observed
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new observations, say {λi : i = 1, ...,m}, and computes the share qi ∈ [0, 1] of expenditure
devoted to good i in the past. The updated value of λ is
λ
′
=
(
1−
m∑
i=1
αiqi
)
λ+
m∑
i=1
αiqiλi. (16)
Here αi ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter measuring how much the consumer weighs new information
relative to old. It also captures the consumer’s perception of the permanence of any price
changes. Thus a one-off “fire sale” should not carry weight (very low αi) while a price hike
due to a specific tax levied on a product should have an αi close to one. Also, we would
expect all αi’s to be larger for an individual whose marginal utility diminishes more quickly.
Note that the updating rule also implies that observations of prices of goods that the
consumer does not usually purchase (low qi) have minimal impact on λ. Similarly, if a good
gets priced out of a consumer’s reach, she will stop buying it, so qi will decline and eventually
it will have also have minimal impact on λ.
In summary, we think of our consumer as walking around with a constant λ, periodically
updating it based on observed prices and occasionally (yearly or when major news arrives)
making a forward looking estimate (possibly with the help of a tax accountant).
5 Comparisons
Undergraduate textbooks suggest a rather different tractable subproblem demand function.
For an arbitrary budget B > 0, write
max
x≥0
u(x) s.t. p · x = B. (17)
with first order conditions
ui(x
B) = νpi, i = 1, ..., n
B = p · xB. (18)
Denote the solution (again, assumed unique and smooth) by xB(p) = (xB1 (p), ..., x
B
n (p)).
We shall refer to xB as the constant-budget demand function for the subproblem.11
prices to changes in the price level. See Deaton (1977) for an exploration of that idea.
11Textbooks often refer to xB as the Marshallian demand function, in distinction to the Hicksian demand
function which holds constant the utility level rather than B or λ. The literature survey in Section A.1 will
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Observe that (10) differs from (18) only in two respects: it omits the budget constraint,
and λ replaces ν. Recall that ν is the marginal consumption utility of a dollar spent over the
budget. If B is not chosen optimally (as the optimal subproblem expenditure in the lifetime
problem (6)) then ν differs from the true marginal cost of overspending.
Applying a set of fixed budgets to a set of separable subproblems will typically generate
a set of different shadow prices ν of expenditure. A standard argument shows that this
is inefficient, and the consumer will increase utility by reallocating expenditure from low ν
subproblems to those with high ν. In contrast, a consumer who takes the trouble to optimize
once can use the same λ over and over without incurring significant efficiency losses.
The case u21 = 0 of separable goods is particularly instructive. Constant-budget demand
asserts that such goods are (gross) substitutes, due to the pecuniary externality incorporated
into in the income effect. As noted earlier, moneysworth demand has no cross-price effect. It
directly reflects the “want independence” between the goods, while the pecuniary externality
is fully internalized in λ.
Another difference spotlights unanswered questions about the source of the budget con-
straint. Relaxing the Inada condition, one still usually gets interior solutions given a
constant budget, while moneysworth demand can often be zero. Consider, for example,
u(x) = ln(x + 1), p = 1 and λ ≡ 1. The “bang for buck” that the consumer can get is
less than the opportunity cost for any value of x. The textbook consumer would simply
spend her budget. For example, if faced with the choice of how much Beluga caviar to buy,
an average moneysworth consumer would pass, while a textbook consumer with $10 in his
pocket would by a gram. The counter argument that the consumer would not consider the
$10 as her budget for the caviar raises the followup question: and how did she arrive at that
decision? Every textbook we know is silent here.
We are now ready to ask the crucial question. How good are the two approximations
xλ(·) and xB(·) of the exact subproblem solution x∗(P̂)? Recall that the latter expression
solves the consumer’s lifetime plan
max
x≥0
u(x) + V (L− p̂ · x) (19)
note that xB actually owes more to Hicks than to Marshall, whose preferred demand function was a special
case of xλ.
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given anticipated prices P̂ (including subvector p̂) and lifetime income L. To make a fair
comparison, suppose that B and λ are both chosen optimally, so B = p̂ · x∗ and λ =
V ′(L−B). We’ve set things up so that all three solutions coincide when subproblem prices
are exactly as anticipated, but otherwise, of course, the solutions generally diverge. The
question then becomes: how do the subproblem price sensitivities of the approximations xλ
and xB compare to that of the exact solution x∗?
The next Proposition provides a precise answer, using the Hessian notation introduced
earlier.
Proposition 3. Given a separable subproblem of dimension n ≥ 2 and a price vector P̂ with
subproblem price vector p̂, let the exact and approximate demand functions x∗(·),xλ(·) and
xB(·) be defined as in previous paragraphs. Then there exist a vector a(p̂, H) ∈ <n and a
constant b(p̂, H) ∈ <, such that for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, the price sensitivities are
∂x∗j
∂pi
(p̂) =
(−1)i+j(−p̂i)n−2λ |Hij| − ajV ′′(L−B)
(−p̂i)n−2 |H| − bV ′′(L−B) , (20)
∂xλj
∂pi
(p̂) =
(−1)i+jλ |Hij|
|H| , and (21)
∂xBj
∂pi
(p̂) =
aj
b
. (22)
Appendix B contains a proof of Proposition 3, including formulae for a(p̂, H) and b(p̂, H).12
Of course, equation (21) simply recapitulates Proposition 1.
Comparing the first and third equations in Proposition 3, one can see that xB(·) is a
reliable approximation of the exact demand function x∗(·) only if V ′′(L−B) dominates the
other factors. That is, the approximation is reliable only if we can accurately determine the
appropriate budget B = p̂ · x∗ and we also know that the indirect utility function is tightly
curved at just the right point.
12For the single good case we have the following simplified expressions
∂x∗
∂p
(p̂) =
λ−BV ′′(L−B)
u′′(x∗)− p2V ′′(L−B) , (23)
∂xλ
∂p
(p̂) =
λ
u′′(x∗)
, and (24)
∂xB
∂p
(p̂) =
B
p2
. (25)
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By contrast, no fine-tuning is needed for the constant-λ approximation. When −V ′′(L−
B) is small, i.e., the indirect utility function is nearly linear around the optimal expenditure,
then the price sensitivity of xλ is very close to its true lifetime-optimal value given in the
first equation. Indeed (see the Appendix for a proof), the quality of this approximation
increases monotonically as curvature decreases, and the approximation becomes exact in the
“risk-neutral” (locally linear) case:
Corollary 2. For each j ∈ {1, ..., n} we have
∣∣∣∂x∗j∂pi (p̂)− ∂xλj∂pi (p̂)∣∣∣ ↓ 0 as |V ′′(L−B)| ↓ 0.
Note that the sign of the approximation error depends sensitively on the parameters.
Finally, recall from Section 4 that a decent approximation of λ = V ′(L − B) is readily
available for small separable subproblems and, in contrast to the appropriate budget B, it
is independent of the anticipated subproblem prices.
6 Extensions
In practice, some goods are indivisible, and most consumers face liquidity constraints. We
now show how the analysis extends to cover these important considerations.
6.1 Liquidity constraints
To deal with constraints on transferring purchasing power across time, we need to augment
our model with an additional state variable: the freely available liquidity. When the con-
sumer wishes to spend more than that, she will have to bear the cost of borrowing (captured
by an interest rate); when she spends less, she benefits from returns on her saving (again cap-
tured by an interest rate). To focus sharply on the main point, we assume that interest rates
are constant across maturities and quantities borrowed (or saved); extensions to cover term
premiums and quantity premiums are conceptually (if not notationally) straightforward.
Assume, then, that the consumer has available liquid purchasing power L0 ∈ [0, L]
and earns interest at rate q ≥ −1 on unspent liquid balances, but pays interest at rate
r ≥ max{0, q} on expenditures in excess of L0. Using the notation [y]+ = max{0, y}, her
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continuation purchasing power is
L− e(p · x;L0), where e(p · x;L0) = p · x + r [p · x− L0]+ − q [L0 − p · x]+ .
Rewriting (6) as V˜ (L,L0) = maxx∈<n+ [u(x) + V (L− e(p · x;L0))], the first order condition
becomes
ui(x) = ei(p · x;L0)V ′(L− e(p · x;L0)), i = 1, ..., n,
where
ei(p · x;L0) =
 pi(1 + q), if L0 > p · xpi(1 + r), if L0 < p · x.
Approximating V ′(L− e(p · x;L0)) by λ̂ = V ′(L), as before, we have
ui(x) = piλ˜, i = 1, ..., n, (26)
where
λ˜ =
 λ̂(1 + q), if L0 > p · xλ̂(1 + r), if L0 < p · x. (27)
Figure 1 illustrates the omitted case L0 = p · x, where the marginal value of money is not
defined in (27), but neither is it necessary for the solution as the optimal expenditure is
given by the current liquidity.
The only change relative to the unconstrained case is that λ now is a step function
rather than a constant: the consumer continues to move out on her IEP until her price-
scaled marginal utility drops to λ, which now is increasing in expenditure (and decreasing
in liquidity).
Note that this set-up is sufficiently general to capture some important special cases. A
“paycheck-to-paycheck” consumer is liquidity constrained in the sense that she is unable to
borrow and she cannot earn interest on any saving she might have, so q = 0 and r =∞. In
Figure 1, the opportunity cost of expenditure simply follows the V ′ line until L0, at which
point it goes vertical with no ceiling.13
13If such a consumer is faced with several purchasing decisions (subproblems) subject to a unified liquidity
constraint, then equation (27) and Figure 1, with q = 0 and r = ∞, apply only to the final decision. For
the prior decisions she should still use the unconstrained λ rule, where the constraint will be built into her
continuation (indirect) utility. When the borrowing constraint binds, the consumer’s time horizon effectively
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expenditure	  
Figure 1: Optimal consumption with liquidity constraint. Expenditure is along the IEP, where uipi
is the same for all goods i = 1, ..., n. In the case shown, optimal expenditure px∗ equals available
liquidity L0.
The budget-constrained consumer featured in textbooks is an even more extreme special
case. He is supposed to be unable even to store any of the subproblem budget, so r = ∞
and q = −1. In Figure 1, the bottom step is on the horizontal axis and the other step is in
the sky, so the consumer always “chooses” to spend exactly her liquid assets.
It may be worth noting that liquidity constraints do not bring back the textbook income
effect. The marginal effect of a change in liquidity continues to be zero, except when sub-
problem expenditure is close to available liquidity L0, and even here the effect is attenuated
to the extent that the jump in λ is finite.
shrinks to a single pay period. This would decrease the precision of the estimate of λ, leading to a normative
and a positive prediction. First, the final decision should incorporate more goods than usual to decrease
the bias in λ. Second, as the estimate is an underestimate – as V ′(L− px) > V ′(L) – paycheck-to-paycheck
consumers using the moneysworth demand should be bad at consumption smoothing and get to the end of
the month short of money.
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A thought experiment offers some quantitative perspective. Assume that at the current
price (normalized to 1), our consumer is unconstrained but spends all her liquid wealth
on a (composite) good. We now ask the question: by how much does the price have to
decrease, so that she is willing to increase her expenditure and borrow? In terms of Figure
1, what proportional price decrease will move u′/p up from the bottom of the step to the
top? Inspection of (27) yields the answer of 1+q
1+r
≈ q − r. For a typical consumer the
rate difference between borrowing via credit card or depositing in a savings account might
be about 2% per month. That is, a mere 2% price decrease would remove her liquidity-
constrained inertia. For larger price decreases she would seem identical to an unconstrained
consumer with λ = λ̂(1 + r), and her moneysworth demand would display no income effect.
6.2 Indivisible goods
Suppose that the consumer faces the small separable subproblem of whether or not to buy
a single indivisible good (or basket of goods) at price p. Indivisibility is captured in the
constraint x ∈ {1, 0}, and we normalize u(0) = 0. Thus the objective function (9) becomes
max
x∈{1,0}
[u(x)− λxp] = max {0, u(1)− λp} . (28)
Dividing by p, one can say that the consumer calculates the ratio u(1)
p
of perceived quality to
price and compares it to λ. If the quality-price ratio, interpreted as value for money, exceeds
the marginal utility of money, then she will buy, and otherwise not buy.14
When the consumer has to choose just one of several mutually exclusive varieties or
baskets, the quality-price ratio no longer suffices. A very small basket may offer a high value
for money, but still provide only a small utility gain.15 Instead, the consumer should rank
baskets bk = (xk1, ..., x
k
n) of indivisibles (so each x
k
i = 0 or 1) at price vector p according
to their net utility gain, gk = u(bk) − λp · bk. Then the consumer picks the basket with
14Hauser and Urban (1986) pose as alternative hypotheses that consumers use “value for money,” u/p,
or “net value,” u − λp, to prioritize purchases of indivisibles. Our analysis shows that the two rankings
are equivalent for yes/no decisions, but we shall now show that “net value” is the appropriate criterion for
mutually exclusive alternatives.
15Note that this crucial detail is overlooked in the melioration theory of Herrnstein and Prelec (1991),
which posits that the option with higher utility per $ is the one that is chosen (in a distributed choice
problem).
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highest gk as long as it is positive, and otherwise picks the null basket b0 = (0, ..., 0) at
price p · b0 = 0 and gain g0 = u(0) − λp · b0 = 0. It follows (after dropping any basket
that is dominated by another basket with lower price and higher utility) that basket k will
be preferred to basket j if and only if u(b
k)−u(bj)
p·bk−p·bj ≥ λ. The gain in utility by choosing k
over j must exceed the shadow utility of the additional expenditure, i.e., the incremental
quality-price ratio must exceed the marginal utility of money.16
By contrast, the budget constrained consumer would pick the highest quality item that
her budget permits. For example, suppose that the consumer has two baskets available, with
u(b1) < u(b2) and p · b1 = B < p · b2 = p · b1 + ε. If and only if
u(b2)− u(b1) < λε (29)
we have 0 < g2 = u(b2) − λp · b2 < u(b1) − λp · b1 = g1, so that both decision rules lead
to the purchase of cheaper basket 1. Condition (29) captures how the consumer trades off
instantaneous utility gain against the shadow value of money. If the price difference is small
enough, she will go for the more expensive basket (unlike the budget constrained consumer).
(29) also shows how to respond to the appearance of a new variety, or a change in the
valuation of an existing variety. Suppose that the perceived quality difference between the
baskets increases sufficiently, keeping the price difference the same. This change would not
affect the choice according to the budget rule, but it would again lead to a switch according
to the λ rule (and according to lifetime optimization).
The purchase of a single big ticket item, like an automobile, introduces two variations.
First, to have a better approximation, the value at which the Taylor expansion is centered
should be L minus the representative price of the cars considered. Second, if the price range
under consideration is large (both Fiat and Ferrari are in the relevant choice set) then the
marginal utility of money might be higher for more expensive cars. Thus we should set a
different marginal utility of money λi for each different price(range). The consumer should
then choose the variety, qi, which maximizes her net utility gain u(qi)− λipi.
16Note that for yes/no decisions the quality-price ratio is also incremental but the benchmark is normalized
to zero.
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7 Discussion
The moneysworth approach to consumer choice centers on λ, the marginal utility of money.
Defining λ as the opportunity cost of expenditure in the continuation problem that follows
a separable subproblem, we obtain the rule that expenditure on a good (or on baskets of
goods along the appropriate income expansion path, IEP) should increase until its marginal
utility diminishes to λ.
For small separable subproblems, we obtain moneysworth demand functions xλ that share
some features with their standard “Marshallian” counterparts xB – notably, both lie on the
same subproblem IEP – but xλ has several distinct advantages.
• It is very simple and specific – the single number λ is a sufficient statistic for the hugely
complex rest-of-life problem. By contrast, each subproblem requires its own budget B
in the standard approach, and short of re-solving the lifetime problem, it is unclear
how B might be determined.
• It is robust to changes in subproblem prices; no change in λ is required when p changes.
By contrast, the appropriate B depends sensitively on p.
• Its elasticities are a first-order approximation of the true (lifetime-optimal) elasticities.
Standard Marshallian elasticities are close to true elasticities only in the special case
that they coincide with xλ’s.
• It is quite intuitive – the consumer tries directly to get her money’s worth.17
Our moneysworth approach offers a fresh perspective on the traditional distinction be-
tween non-pecuniary consumption externalities and pecuniary externalities. The former
recognizes that how much the consumer values a certain quantity of a good may depend
on what else is in her consumption basket. Often this kind of externality extends only to a
small set of goods, e.g., a few complements and close substitutes, and so can be internalized
in a low-dimensional separable subproblem of the lifetime problem. On the other hand,
pecuniary externalities are pervasive because expenditures are mutually exclusive: money
17We suspect that it is also quite descriptive of actual consumer behavior, but we are not aware of any
empirical studies so far that compare the predictive power of xλ and xB .
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spent on one good is not available to purchase any other good. But λ precisely captures this
kind of externality.
By contrast, it is hard to specify the appropriate subproblem to which to apply a budget
B in the standard approach. The larger the set of goods, the better internalized is the
pecuniary externality, and the closer one gets to the true lifetime problem. But at the same
time, one loses the tractability of low-dimensional partial equilibrium analysis.
Standard partial equilibrium analysis routinely conflates the available liquidity L with the
expenditure B targeted at a subproblem. Otherwise put, the natural subproblem boundaries
need not coincide with the boundaries of binding liquidity constraints. Given access to
perfectly liquid financial markets, it is erroneous to specify B other than the lifetime budget
constraint. When there are additional liquidity constraints, they are best dealt with as in
section 6.1, where the textbook analysis is shown to be an extreme and unrealistic special
case.
A key insight from the moneysworth approach is that budgets should not be applied
piecemeal to subproblems, but instead all subproblems should be solved consistently using a
single sufficient statistic, the marginal utility of money. The point is that funds are fungible,
as has long been recognized in other branches of economics.18
To streamline our presentation, we focused on consumer choice, but similar reasoning
applies to work decisions. For example, a piece rate worker (or consultant) optimally works
until the marginal disutility equals the wage times λ. Likewise the “big ticket” version of
the λ rule tells a worker whether to accept a salaried job, or one with fixed hours. We
also streamlined the presentation by neglecting corner solutions, multiple optima and non-
differentiable solutions. We leave all these generalizations for future research.
One final thought. For several generations, economics instructors have tortured un-
dergraduates with various decompositions of income and substitution effects, with picky
distinctions between gross and net substitutes and complements, and with ordinal versus
cardinal utility. An important benefit of the moneysworth approach is that it sweeps away
such dross, and brings consumer choice theory closer to common sense.
18In public finance, for example, it is well known that a uniform income tax is more efficient for raising a
given amount of revenue than a collection of specific taxes on individual items.
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A Appendix: Connections
Our approach to consumer choice connects to numerous topics that economists previously
have considered in isolation. Here are some that have caught our attention.
A.1 Historical perspectives
The idea of a cardinal utility function defined over purchasing power goes back at least to
Bernoulli (1738) and Cramer (1728), but Bentham (1802) was apparently the first to develop
the idea to explain choice in the absence of risk. These economists, and their successors, pre-
sumed that the utility function was concave, if only because the more attractive consumption
opportunities would be selected first.
Marshall’s (1890, 1920) theory of consumer demand centered on λ. In the special case that
utility is additively separable in each good, he obtained the crucial first order condition that
marginal utility for each good equals its price times the marginal utility of money. Given
the market price pi for some good i (tea was Marshall’s favorite example), the consumer
increases or decreases his consumption xi until the marginal utility it brings is equal to the
market price scaled by λ, the marginal utility of money, assumed exogenous and constant.
“Edgeworth destroyed this pleasant simplicity and specificity when he wrote the total
utility function as f(x1, x2, x3, ...),” says Stigler (1950, p. 322). It fell to Hicks and Allen
(1934) to show how to impose a budget set to derive demand functions and cross-price
elasticities when goods might have complements and substitutes. Their analysis, developed
further by Paul Samuelson and a host of other economists, ultimately became textbook
orthodoxy.
Biswas (1977) eventually showed that Marshall’s approach could be extended to interde-
pendent goods without the imposition of a budget constraint. He noted that the marginal
utility of money is constant only in the short run and thus its adjustment is of relevance.
Biswas’ purpose was to explain Marshall’s approach, so he did not develop a full-fledged
alternative theory of the consumer; e.g., as far as we know he did not show the relation to
the IEP or explore the basis of the constant λ assumption. He was content to establish the
existence of a downward-sloping demand function satisfying Marshall’s first-order conditions,
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and labored to salvage Giffen goods by writing out an adjustment process for λ based on the
– what seems to us peculiar – assumption that the consumer observes the ex post optimal
expenditure (E∗) while she adjust her λ only partially.
A.2 Cardinality
The other reason Marshall’s approach to consumer demand fell out of favor was that it
required cardinal utility. Hicks and Allen (1934) and later writers argued that utility levels
are unobservable, so consumer theory is on firmer ground when it is based on only ordinal
properties of preferences.
Can our approach be implemented with ordinal preferences? It is true that maximizing
any positive monotone transformation of our key objective function u(x)− λ̂p · x would lead
to the same maximand, and leave the indifference curves intact. However, that objective
function is reduced form; it is justified by separability (overall utility is u + U) and com-
parability (rescaling u entails the same rescaling of U). Comparability between subproblem
and continuation problem is a cardinal property, in that the relative value of utility must
be preserved across the subproblem boundary.19 Our definition of separability is also car-
dinal. Intriguingly, Debreu (1960) proposed an ordinal definition of separability, essentially
that preferences over subbundles x, y ∈ <n+ are independent of the remaining components
χ = (xn+1, xn+2, ..., xN) ∈ <N−n+ . He showed under quite general conditions that this entails
a cardinal (VNM) utility function over separable subproblems.
Hence our theory is intrinsically cardinal. But we see that as a feature, not a bug. Car-
dinal utility has rebounded after modernization by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
especially following Friedman and Savage (1948). Varian’s (1992) textbook, for example,
uses cardinal functions without apology in earlier chapters on production technology and
later chapters on risky choice. Cardinal preferences are routinely assumed in applied work
(e.g., in industrial organization) and in game theory, and ordinal theory has begun to seem
anachronistic. Why should consumer choice in the absence of risk be the only topic left that
19To put it another way, λ is defined via the utility representation and maximization – as it is the slope of
the indirect utility function – not from raw preferences. As a result, if we rescale the utility function u+U ,
we have to adjust λ so that it continues to measure the marginal utility of money both today and in the
continuation. This only happens if the transformation is positive affine, as in vNM utility.
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insists on using ordinal preferences?
Arguably, revealed preference theory is the intellectual pinnacle of ordinality, and it has
testable implications for observed choices. It is therefore important to note that moneysworth
demand has its own revealed preference theory suitable for empirical testing. As explained
in Sa´kovics (2013), having arbitrary budgets and arbitrary λ’s are equivalent in terms of
reconciling a given set of choices to the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).
However, moneysworth demand with constant λ implies that we need to replace GARP by
the stronger Axiom of Revealed Valuation (ARV).20
A.3 Macro connections
Frisch (1932, 1959) was among the first economists to pose a representative agent’s intertem-
poral consumption problem as maximizing the discounted sum of a fixed concave felicity (i.e.,
subutility) function v for composite consumption c each period t, subject only to a lifetime
budget constraint. Of course, relative to the general equilibrium problem posed in Section
2, Frisch’s problem is a special case in which the continuation is an evenly spaced sequence
of subproblems identical to the current subproblem, and separation is built in. Assuming
that the agent’s personal discount rate is equal to the interest rate in a frictionless finan-
cial market, the first order (i.e., Euler) condition for this optimization problem states that
marginal felicity v′(ct) is constant across periods and equal to the Lagrange multiplier on the
budget constraint (e.g., Deaton, 1992, Chapter 1, equations 5-9).21 Here λ is not a simple
approximation, but rather is the exact GE opportunity cost of expenditure, albeit in a highly
stylized model.
Macroeconomists exploring consumption smoothing and the permanent income hypothe-
20To summarize the main formal result, assume that we have T observations of a consumer’s chosen
bundles, xt ∈ <n+, at price vectors, pt ∈ <n++. Let atj = pt · (xj − xt) denote the pecuniary advantage
of the chosen bundle xt relative to an arbitrary bundle xj . Then ARV states: For every ordered subset
{i, j, k, ..., s} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., T}, aij + ajk + ...+ asi ≥ 0. The main theorem states: If and only if the observed
choices satisfy ARV, they are rationalizable by a cardinal utility function of the form u(x)− λp · x.
21Allen (1933) interpreted Frisch’s constant λ as an unjustified imposition of additional restrictions on the
utility function. Eventually, Brown and Calsamiglia (2003) noted that Frisch demand functions are better
understood as related to Marshall’s theory of consumer demand.
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sis adapted and extended Frisch’s approach.22 The papers in this tradition that come closest
to our own work were written in the 1980s by Deaton, Browning, and various coauthors.
Browning (1985/2005) re-expresses the Euler equation in terms of the marginal utility of
expenditure, and obtains what we would call a moneysworth demand function. Referring
to this function as Frisch demand, he argues that it is more relevant to fiscal policy analy-
sis than the usual constant-budget (“Marshallian”) or constant-utility (“Hicksian”) demand
functions, and shows how it can be estimated from aggregate data despite the unobserv-
ability of λ. Browning et al. (1985) consider the somewhat more abstract problem where
consumption is additively separable in all goods (or at least “block additive,” i.e., that it
consists of a finite number of separable subproblems) and is subject to a single overall budget
constraint. They construct the consumer “profit function,” a renormalized version of our
objective function (9), and use variants on textbook duality identities to obtain properties
of the corresponding Frisch demand function. The main properties, some of which help to
identify econometric specifications, are (a) degree 0 homogeneity in p and r = 1/λ (which
also is transparent from our equation (10) or even from (9)); (b) symmetry of cross partials
(as noted after our Prop 1); (c) substitution matrix is proportional to H−1 (as can also be
seen from Prop 1); and (d) downward sloping demand (again noted after Prop 1). The article
also gives formulas for moving among Marshallian, Hicksian and Frisch demand.
The concerns of this strand of literature – consumption smoothing and estimating elas-
ticities from aggregate national consumption data – are quite different from ours, and con-
sequently so are the contributions. This literature does not consider the quality of approx-
imations to GE demand as in our Proposition 3 (they do not need to approximate in their
stylized GE model), nor investigate how λ might be determined and adjusted at the dis-
aggregated individual level, nor discuss separability and the microfoundations of individual
consumer behavior.
22Heckman (1974) was apparently the first to use λ-constant comparative statics in such models. Bewley
(1977) proposed a consumer theory for the life-time problem using the constancy of marginal utility of money.
See Bewley (2007, Chapter 8.3) for a recent synthesis.
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A.4 Micro connections
Quasilinear utility. The objective function u(x) − λ̂p · x at the heart of our analysis
provides a foundation for, and slightly generalizes, quasi-linear utility. Textbook treatments
(e.g., Varian, 1992, p. 154, 164-7) often assume that n = 1 so the variable of interest x is
scalar, and that λ̂ = 1. In our notation, the textbook quasi-linear utility function would be
written as u(x) +m with budget constraint m = L− px.
Our approach shows that textbook quasilinear preferences can be justified for single
separable goods, and can be generalized directly for separable bundles of related goods.
Given a constant exogenous λ, there is no loss of generality in using a VNM utility function
for u (and implicitly, U) that normalizes its value to 1, but our analysis sheds light on the
conditions for which the constancy assumption is justified.
Valuation. Most of the literature on price determination treats an agent’s valuation of an
indivisible object as an exogenous parameter. As such, it works just fine, as long as we admit
to the assumption of a cardinal quasi-linear utility function lurking in the background. For a
start, our approach rationalizes the use of such a utility function, providing solid foundations
for valuation based models. In addition, it also serves to endogenize the determination of a
consumer’s willingness to pay.
To spell this out, first recall that the valuation v of an object A is typically defined
implicitly by u(A,m − v) = u(0,m), where m is the money holding and we ignore the
additional arguments in the (not fully specified) utility function u. By contast, from the
moneysworth approach it is immediate that the explicit value is v = (u(A) − u(0))/λ, and
also the utility function becomes clearly understood as the utility derived from the basket
of goods considered together with A in the subproblem that defines λ.
The decomposition of v into a utility factor and a value of money factor has useful con-
sequences. For example, we can endogenize v without requiring the consumer to change
her taste (u). In other words, we can make willingness to pay dependent on the circum-
stances – such as reference prices – maintaining the object’s utility value, and hence welfare,
unchanged. Previously, in order to introduce welfare neutral distortions researchers had to
resort to an “as if” approach, where it was counterfactually assumed that it was the per-
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ception of prices that was distorted (see Sa´kovics, 2011).23 Using the moneysworth demand
function, all we need is a discrete change in λ to achieve the same behavior.
Separability and decentralization. Separating subproblems became part of economists’
intellectual agenda following Hayek’s (1945) influential treatment of informational decentral-
ization. Leontieff (1947), Strotz (1957, 1959), Gorman (1959, 1968), and Simon and Ando
(1961), among others, offered ways to decompose complex problems into simpler subproblems
with manageable externalities.
Much of that literature dealt with firms, rather than households, but there is an in-
triguing connection. Multidivisional firms face a question reminiscent of ours: under what
conditions can the firm profitably decentralize real investment decisions? To the extent that
the divisions are separable, the moneysworth approach suggests the following decentralized
procedure. Let λ be the parent firm’s opportunity cost of funds, proxied (for example) by the
weighted average cost of capital. Then each division should invest in scalable projects up to
the point that the marginal return falls to λ, and choose among mutually exclusive projects
by maximizing present value calculated using λ. This is the direct generalization of the g rule
in section 6.2. When divisions are not separable, the returns should be estimated in terms of
incremental net benefit to the firm as a whole, rather than just to the division. Remarkably,
this procedure is essentially the same as that recommended in standard corporate finance
textbooks (see, for example, Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, 2008, Part Four).
Weitzman (1974) discusses the decentralization of decisions on the production side. He
compares the relative advantages of quantity targets vs. transfer prices for a production unit
that is subject to frequent shocks to its costs. He finds no clear winner as the dead-weight
losses depend on the relative slopes of marginal cost and marginal benefit curves (much
like the incidence of ad valorem taxes). In the relevant special case, Weitzman’s conclusion
agrees with ours: prices have the advantage when coordination between units is not a major
concern and when there are several units producing substitutes. Indeed, in the subcase where
the marginal benefit is constant for producing an additional unit, Weitzman would declare
23Incidentally, we note that, as a first step towards a consumer theory without binding budget constraints,
Sa´kovics (2011) features a model with soft budgets. His consumers satisfy a budget constraint for misper-
ceived prices, so actually they either under or overspend.
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transfer price, that is the marginal benefit λ, as the clear winner.
A.5 Behavioral connections
Miscalibration. Of course, some consumers may have a persistently biased view of their
true marginal utility for money. A miser is someone who (perhaps because of an impov-
erished childhood and stalled adjustment) maintains an unreasonably high λ, relative to
typical preferences and to his actual lifetime opportunities. Likewise, a spendthrift main-
tains an unreasonably low λ. Thus the λ rule can be thought of as a heuristic that accurately
describes behavior even when it is suboptimal because λ is badly calibrated.
Money illusion. Lifetime utility U(X) depends only on actual consumption, and not
directly on nominal quantities such as L and P ; recall that the indirect utility function is
homogeneous of degree 0 in (L, P ). Hence a proportional change in all prices (and income)
will have no effect on the consumption plans or utility of Homo Economicus. The same is
true in the textbook treatment of a subproblem with the budget B adjusted in the same
proportion as the price vector.
However, inflation in the real world is much messier than a simultaneous proportional
change. An important empirical regularity is that relative prices become more volatile as
the measured rate of inflation rises (see, for example, Heymann and Leijonhufvud, 1995).
Actual people updating λ, therefore, are unlikely to immediately adjust to a change in the
price level. According to (16) they will lag in reacting to observed nominal increases in
prices of purchased goods (and, by extension, overreact to nominal increases in wages; see,
for example, Genesove and Mayer, 2001). That is, in the parlance of macroeconomic theory,
they will suffer from money illusion.
If prices settle down, an adaptive moneysworth consumer will, after some lag, find a new
λ appropriate to the new price level. The illusion fades.
System 1 vs 2. Our consumer has two operational phases: normally she just goes
around with her λ and makes quasi-automatic decisions, while occasionally she updates
her λ, using a more thoughtful procedure. This dual process fits well with the two-system
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approach originated by Stanovich and West (2000) and popularized by Kahneman (2011).24
System 1 works like a reflex and has no significant cost to operate (a bit like the body’s
vegetative system), while System 2 ponders decisions but requires time and attention, which
are in limited supply. There are certain cues in the environment which give the control over
to System 2, otherwise the default decision maker is System 1. Our model goes beyond this
switching scheme by introducing an element of communication between the systems: λ.
By tracking neural responses to the observation of the price of an item, Knutson et al.
(2007) show that the price of an item generates a significant cue about whether the item
will be purchased. This implies that the decision to buy is mostly based on the price (and
the utility value) of the good, fitting well with moneysworth demand, and its System 1
interpretation.
Mental accounting. We note an alternative heuristic called narrow bracketing, or men-
tal accounting (e.g., Read et al., 1999; and Thaler, 1999). In our terminology, the claim is
that consumers sometimes treat non-separable subproblems as if they were separable, result-
ing in inefficient choices, especially when self control is problematic. For example, a consumer
may regard the health risk as negligible when considering smoking a single cigarette. The
addictive properties of nicotine warrant a broader definition of the subproblem, and the
consumer might come to a different conclusion when considering smoking a pack a day for a
year, or for a decade.
In our view, this literature underlines the importance of separability in defining subprob-
lems. We agree that treating a non-separable subproblem in isolation will typically lead to
suboptimal behavior. Our contribution lies mainly in showing how to incorporate a sufficient
statistic of the continuation into the solution of a separable subproblem. In other words,
rather than ignoring the future our consumers use a simple representation of it.
The mental accounting branch of the literature suggests that people may choose a par-
ticular budget for each subproblem, e.g., bring exactly $2500 to Las Vegas. (The ubiquitous
presence of cash machines in casinos suggests that this self-control device is less than 100%
successful!) Our recommendation, of course, is instead to make choices according to λ. This
doesn’t solve self-control issues, but it has the virtue of simplicity. The consumer then only
24See Evans and Frankish (2009) for a survey.
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needs to carry a single number, while a consumer using mental accounting would have to re-
member a vector. Additionally, we have a simple procedure for how to adapt λ to persistent
price changes, while we know of no such method for budgets, mental or otherwise.
When is each heuristic more commonly used? This seems like a good question to take
to the laboratory, especially since payments received in lab experiments are normally quite
separate from the rest of the subject’s life. One could set up various moderately complicated
lab tasks, and in one treatment frame the tasks in terms of budgets and in another treatment
frame them in terms of the marginal utility of money. Then one could check which treatment
encouraged more efficient choices. A more direct test is simply to provide access to budgeting
tools as well as λ-oriented tools, and to see which the subjects prefer to use.
Other biases. Many sorts of behavioral biases can be captured by assigning plausible but
non-optimal values to λ. Non-standard time preferences illustrate the procedure. An agent
wishing to pay debt early and delay payment for work done as in Prelec and Loewenstein
(1998) can be accommodated by positing a higher λ for consumption and a lower one for
work income.
Considering our model as the rational benchmark, it can “suffer” from yet other behav-
ioral biases. For example, as in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010)25, the consumer may engage in
“local thinking” by not following through with a full-blown updating of λ, rather recalling
the small subset of situations that first come to her mind.
Appendix B: Mathematical Details
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that all three setups share the n − 1 equations defining the
IEP:
piuk = pkui for k 6= i.
The nth equations are26
ui(x) = piV
′(L− p · x), ui(x) = piλ, and p · x = B,
25See also Bordalo et al. 2012, for a related model based on the salience of past observations.
26We have chosen the ith coordinates as we will be checking sensitivity to the ith price.
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for the global, the λ and the budget solutions, respectively. Differentiation of the common
equations with respect to pi yields
uk + pi
∑
m
ukm
∂xm
∂pi
= pk
∑
m
uim
∂xm
∂pi
,
what simplifies to ∑
m
(pkuim − piukm) ∂xm
∂pi
= uk.
Differentiating the other three equations, we have
∑
m
uim
∂xm
∂pi
= V ′(L− p · x)− pi
(
xi +
∑
m
pm
∂xm
∂pi
)
V ′′(L− p · x),
∑
m
uim
∂xm
∂pi
= λ,
and
xi +
∑
m
pm
∂xm
∂pi
= 0.
If V ′′(L − B) = 0, then it is immediate that the price sensitivities of the lambda rule
will coincide with the optimal ones at p = p̂, while the budget rule would only be a good
approximation by coincidence. Otherwise, denoting the ith row of the Hessian of u(x∗(p̂))
by Hi, we obtain the following three equation systems:
p̂1Hi − p̂iH1
p̂2Hi − p̂iH2
...
Hi + p̂p̂iV
′′
...
p̂nHi − p̂iHn


∂x∗1
∂pi
∂x∗2
∂pi
...
∂x∗i
∂pi
...
∂x∗n
∂pi

=

u1
u2
...
V ′ − x∗i p̂iV ′′
...
un


p̂1Hi − p̂iH1
p̂2Hi − p̂iH2
...
Hi
...
p̂nHi − p̂iHn


∂xλ1
∂pi
∂xλ2
∂pi
...
∂xλi
∂pi
...
∂xλn
∂pi

=

u1
u2
...
λ
...
un

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
p̂1Hi − p̂iH1
p̂2Hi − p̂iH2
...
p̂
...
p̂nHi − p̂iHn


∂xB1
∂pi
∂xB2
∂pi
...
∂xBi
∂pi
...
∂xBn
∂pi

=

u1
u2
...
−xBi
...
un

Denoting the matrices by G,L and D, respectively, we can apply Cramer’s rule to solve
the systems of equations:
∂x∗j
∂pi
=
|Gj|
|G| ,
∂xλj
∂pi
=
|Lj|
|L| , and
∂xBj
∂pi
=
|Dj|
|D| ,
where a superindexed matrix means that its jth column is replaced by the vector on the right-
hand side of its corresponding system. Since when the realized prices equal the expected
ones V ′(L− p · x) = λ and x∗i = xBi it is immediate that
|G| = |L|+ |D| p̂iV ′′ and
∣∣Gj∣∣ = ∣∣Lj∣∣+ ∣∣Dj∣∣ p̂iV ′′.
By subtracting multiples of row i in L it is easy to see that |L| = (−p̂i)n−1 |H| . By the
same method – using the fact that uk = pkλ for all k – we can ensure that the j
th column
of |Lj| has zeros everywhere except in the ith place where it has λ. Writing out the Laplace
expansion it is immediate that |Lj| = (−1)i+jλ(−p̂i)n−1 |Hij|. Finally, let aj = |Dj| and
b = |D| . Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2:
∣∣∣∣ |Lj|+aj p̂iV ′′(−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′ − |Lj|(−p̂i)n−1|H|
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ −(aj(−p̂i)n|H|+|Lj|bp̂i)V ′′((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|
∣∣∣∣ =
−|aj(−p̂i)n|H|+|Lj|bp̂i|V ′′
|((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|| , that is clearly equal to zero when V
′′ = 0. To see that the
convergence is monotone, note that aj and b are independent of V
′′ :
d V
′′
|((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H||
dV ′′
=

|((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H||−V ′′|bp̂i(−p̂i)n−1|H||
|((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H||2|((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H||+V ′′|bp̂i(−p̂i)n−1|H||
|((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H||2
,
where we obtain the upper line if the denominator on the left-hand side is increasing in V ′′
and the bottom line otherwise. As V ′′ < 0, the upper line is clearly positive. The bottom
line as well, as the denominator is decreasing in V ′′ implying that bp̂iV ′′(−p̂i)n−1 |H| > 0,
while ((−p̂i)n−1 |H|)2 > 0 as well. Q.E.D.
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